Cultural Tactics of Salvadoran Gangs Offer Chance for US to Weaken MS-13 by Penner, Hannah
Utah State University 
DigitalCommons@USU 
Undergraduate Honors Capstone Projects Honors Program 
5-2019 
Cultural Tactics of Salvadoran Gangs Offer Chance for US to 
Weaken MS-13 
Hannah Penner 
Utah State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/honors 
 Part of the International Relations Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Penner, Hannah, "Cultural Tactics of Salvadoran Gangs Offer Chance for US to Weaken MS-13" (2019). 
Undergraduate Honors Capstone Projects. 520. 
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/honors/520 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Honors Program at DigitalCommons@USU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors 
Capstone Projects by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please 
contact digitalcommons@usu.edu. 
CULTURAL TACTICS OF SALVADORAN GANGS OFFER 
CHANCE FOR US TO WEAKEN MS-13 
Approved: 
Capstone Mentor 
Dr. Jeannie Johnson 
by 
Hannah Penner 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 





in the Department of Political Science 
Committee Member 
Dr. Veronica Ward 
Director of University Honors Program 
Dr. Kristine Miller 
UT AH ST A TE UNIVERSITY 
Logan, UT 
Spring 2019 
© 2019 Hannah Penner All Rights Reserved 
Abstract 
This paper uses the Cultural Topography framework employed by the intelligence community to 
assess cultural factors of the MS-13 (Mara Salvatrucha) gang orgauization that have policy 
relevance to US national security. MS-13, though originally founded in the 1980s in a small 
sector of LA, has evolved into an international gang with a reputation of ultraviolence with a 
recent increase in gang activity. By striving to explore components ofMS-13's identity, values, 
norms of behavior, and perceptions, this research can be used to create a more timely and 
effective strategy in combatting the present MS-13 threat within the United States. After 
studying the recruitment techniques, history, rituals, and integrated traits of MS-13, this paper 
concludes that the US may be better able to tailor US strategy against MS-13 by changing how 
the US refers to MS-13, encouraging retention strategies of deported gang members, and 
exploiting key vulnerabilities evident in the cultural traits defined by the cultural topography 
method. The purpose of this paper is to convey that, by understanding the cultural implications 
of the MS-13 gang, it will become possible to tailor US strategy in a more effective manner. 
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KEYFJNDINGS 
Understanding the cultural tactics of Salvadoran gangs, particularly MS-I 3, can help the 
US decrease gang activity, violence, and recruitment, as well as deters illegal 
immigration to the US from El Salvador. 
MS-13 (Mara Salvatrucha) originated in Los Angeles, California in the 1980s, and 
became an international organization after deportation tactics in the LA barrios exported the 
threat to El Salvador in the 1990s. Founded by Salvadoran immigrants fleeing a harsh civil war 
(1980-1992), MS-13 has evolved into a predator gang with a reputation ofultraviolence, with 
gang activity increasing in recent years. MS-B targets the often negative or distant perception of 
El Salvador that Salvadorans living in the US have and further coerces new members to replace 
any past identity with a MS-13 identity upon initiation. This new identity demands gang loyalty 
and encompasses complete cultural restructuring. This identity estrangement and replacement is 
so thorough, that when MS-13 members are deported from the US back to El Salvador, they feel 
no attachment and reintegration is difficult, consequentially increasing gang activity and illegal 
immigration back to the US. 
After new recruits undergo this identity estrangement and replacement process, the newly 
initiated MS-13 gang members are expected to live according to a strict gang code that results in 
harsh punishment and recruitment methods that are unwanted by many members of MS-13 and 
their recruitment pool. The US, particularly the FBI and local law enforcement, could capitalize 
on these unwanted norms, potentially decreasing illegal immigration, MS-B recruitment, and 
general gang violence. A potential inhibitor of seizing this opportunity is found in the 
unchanging fighting culture of MS-13 that necessitates an enemy to be-fought. If MS-13 
perceives the US to be directly exploiting their culture, they may feel attacked and, viewing the 
US as a direct enemy, may charmel their fighting nature to attack locai'police forces. 
The dichotomous cosmology held by MS-B is perpetuated by the Salvadoran 'iron-fist' 
anti-gang policy. This US originated policy, which has since been put into action by the 
Salvadoran government, encourages the police force to use harsh punishment techniques, 
consequentially strengthening MS-B's perception of the government as a corrupt enemy. This 
perception has led to military behavior from gang members and the police force alike, increasing 
regional violence and illegal immigration to the United States. Just as MS-B's enemy-centric 
view of the world explains their warlike nature towards government entities, MS-B's perception 
of other gangs is likewise defined by a militarized environment of competition and rivalry. As 
MS-13 seeks to become the dominant status holder against other gangs, they demonstrate a need 
for attention that could potentially be unknowingly satisfied by US policy. As US leaders more 
evenly reference the general gang threat and decrease their references to MS-B atrocities in 
public forums, they could weaken the credibility and reputation necessary for MS-B to thrive. 
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SCOPE NOTE 
This paper uses the Cultural Topography framework employed by the intelligence 
community to assess cultural factors of the MS-13 gang organization that have policy relevance 
to US national security. This analytic technique strives to explore components ofMS-13's 
identity, norms of behavior, values, and perceptions to understand which strategy will prove 
most timely and effective in combatting the MS-13 threat. As policy makers understand the 
cultural tactics employed by MS-13 and the core components that define this gang, opportunities 
for exploitation and areas of warning can be found. 
It is important to note that when referring to MS-13, this paper is referencing the wide 
nominal umbrella that covers a complex and loose network of nodes throughout the US and El 
Salvador. These groups, many of which have no knowledge of each other, are connected by 
name and cultural components but not by any form of central leadership, making the gang 
difficult to pinpoint, target, and exploit. As such, only cultural aspects of MS-13 that were 
evident across multiple regions and nations and are integral to all MS-13 members, are explored. 
Some policy recommendations may not apply to a specific node if their group culture deviates 
from the general MS-13 trend. However, the cultural aspects of MS-13 that are tracked 
throughout this paper are seen as foundational to what differentiates MS-13 from other gangs, 
and applies to most, if not all, cliques. By targeting the foundational cultural components of an 
organization that is connected by culture only, outlier cultural cliques will likely weaken as the 
larger gang identity is exploited. 
The author's basic Spanish skills allowed for sources to be used from both El Salvador 
and the United States to get a fair representation of the gang threat for, and relationship between, 
both nations. The majority of sources focus on the origin city of the gang, namely LA, 
California, but include reports from various cases across the US and El Salvador to test the 
robustness of the cultural trait present within LA gang nodes. To obtain the cultural components 
necessary, personal interviews of gang members in both LA and El Salvador conducted by field 
anthropologists, immigrant asylum legal cases, Salvadoran and US news sources, PhD 
dissertations, and relevant police force comments, were used. Congressional documents, 
presidential briefs, news sources, and law enforcement websites all provided an understanding of 
current US policy toward the MS 13 gang threat. 
To track these foundational cultural components, the testimonies of hardcore gang 
members, or those who dedicate their entire life to the gang, were relied on heavily because they 
are the shot callers within the organization. Periphery members (those that have a life outside of 
the gang) may live the culture, but are not responsible for keeping it alive, making the hardcore 
members the most accurate indicators of cultural norms. Most of these core members were not 
born in the United States, making the policy implications related to El Salvador poignant. 
However, many of the younger members are born within the United States, making the 
recruitment tactics of MS-13 of especial interest. A large portion of strategy recommendations 
are aimed at making MS-13 recruitment methods less effective, to protect US citizens who may 
be at risk of forceful gang recruitment within the United States. 
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MS-13 Identity-Replacement Ritual Increases Gang Activity and Illegal Immigration to US 
Gang-coerced identity replacement in both El Salvador and the US estranges members from their 
Salvadoran identity and replaces it with a MS-13 identity that demands gang loyalty above any 
other ties, 1which inhibits reintegration of gang deportees in El Salvador, increases overall gang 
activity, and precipitates illegal immigration to the US.2 As many of the core Salvadorans felt 
deeply betrayed by their home country (El Salvador), they designed gang culture as a way for 
members to become members, even quasi citizens, of a new MS-13 nation. As part of this 
cultural structuring, there is a high expectation placed on all members to replace whatever 
national, cultural, or individual identity upon entering the gang, with the elevated, enticing 
identity that MS-13 offers. This identity- estrangement and replacement first takes place upon 
initiation into the gang. 
• T.W. Ward, a professor who lived with MS-13 gang members in LA and conducted informal 
interviews with 80 MS-13 gang members from eight different cliques, noted that many young 
gang members viewed the glorious jump in (initiation) to MS-13 as a "drastic shift in identity 
from a plebeian commoner to a holy warrior." 3 
• The first act following initiation involves replacing your name with a placaso, or gang alias.4 
One LA member reported, "I felt like I killed off my old identity as Carlos and replaced it 
with the gangster status of Joker. 5 
Despite the majority ofMS-13 members being ethnically Salvadoran, their sense of belonging is 
stronger with their "barrio brothers" in the gang rather than their fellow citizens in El Salvador, a 
potential result of the distant or negative perspective of their home country. 
• Diego Aguilar represents the sentiments of 10 interviewed Salvadoran deportees when he 
claims he considers himself"American." Diego migrated to the US at the age of7 and grew 
up in New Y orlc It "never occurred to him some could regard him as belonging in El 
Salvador because he always considered the US his natural home." He spent a total of 17 
years in the US before he was deported at age 24.6 
• Victor, a deportee a doctoral student interviewed in El Salvador in 2008, expressed; "I was 
ready to serve my country, ... my whole life was over there, my wife, my kids. I was a total 
American; I was American in my heart, my mind. And for them to just uproot me and just 
throw me (away) .. .I've been banished from my country." 7 
• When asked to write reflective poems about El Salvador, twelve out of twelve hardcore gang 
respondents referred to El Salvador as violent with no connotation of home or intention of 
returning. 8 Likewise, the same twelve US members referenced MS-13 as an "adopted 
family'' with a "sense of belonging. "9 
• Of these twelve members, five of them shared their placaso selection process. All five had 
chosen to change their native Spanish names, to gang names, symbolizing full acceptance of 
their new 'country,' MS-13. Spanish names such as Carlos or Jose, became names such as 
Joker, Trouble, Happy, and Sniper. 10 
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This negative view of El Salvador, the acceptance of the US as their new home, and the 
attachment to the tight community found in MS-13, causes deportee gang members to refuse 
reintegration once deported from the US to El Salvador. The inability to reintegrate, and their 
sense of belonging in their gang node within the US, causes members to continue to influence 
US gang activity while still imprisoned in El Salvador and to return to the US as soon as 
possible, undeterred by threat of re-deportation. 
• Recent investigations in some regions of El Salvador indicate that deported leaders of MS-13 
in El Salvador have been sending representatives to cross into the US illegally to gain control 
of local MS-13 cliques and reconstitute them. These emissaries then connect the local MS-13 
cliques to their jailed leaders in El Salvador by cell phone. 11 
• PhD Dissertation student Mary Kathleen Dingeman-Cerda spent several months in El 
Salvador interviewing 100 Salvadorans deported from the US. The vast majority of her 
study population reported that they had considered the possibility of trying to re-enter the US 
after initial deportation. One of the interviewees, Ernie Martinez, exemplifies these 
considerations, as he made 5 attempts to return to the US after initial deportation, despite 
holding a position of power in El Salvador. He was deported 2 times from Mexico and 3 
times from the US but was planning a sixth attempt upon being interviewed in El Salvador. 12 
• In 2018, an increased migrant flow from the Northern Triangle to the US border formed to 
escape rampant violence and poverty. One previously deported member of the caravan 
quoted violence and recruitment by MS-13 in El Salvador as his motivation for returning, 
this time with his son, to the US, "What I'm truly afraid is that, we go out someplace, we get 
shot ... I want to send [my son] to the States because ... his safety." 13 
Current US policy of deporting MS-13 gang members back to El Salvador could be improved by 
creating a reentry adjustment component for deportees. 14 This reentry component could focus on 
providing deportees with the practical and cultural tools, such as job placement, nationalism 
development, and citizenship awareness, necessary to reintegrate effectively back into El 
Salvador. As deportees begin to form cultural, value-driven connections with El Salvador, they 
will be more likely to smoothly reintegrate into society and less likely to return to the US 
illegally. 
MS-13's Tendency to Severely Punish Betrayal Provides Opportunity to Undermine 
Recruitment 
Decreased illegal immigration, recruitment, and gang violence are possible if US law 
enforcement effectively exploits the taboo in core MS-13 culture that demands members to never 
inform on fellow gangsters. 15 After new recruits undergo the aforementioned identity 
estrangement and replacement process, the newly initiated MS-13 gang members are expected to 
live according to a strict gang ideology, perceived as codified law, that demands complete 
loyalty to the socially constructed nation-state of the MS-13 gang. 
4 
Many founding members of MS-13 perceive the violent environment of El Salvador that forced 
their removal to the States as a form of betrayal. In their minds, betrayed by their home country, 
the Mara Nation will never be betrayed again. 16 To ensure this protection, a strict code was 
created to defend against weak members and shore up gang loyalty. According to this MS-13 
ideology, the only proper response to someone who "rats out," or informs on, a fellow gang 
member is a grotesque death sentence. 
• Informal interviews of 8 hardcore MS-13 members (those who dedicate their lives entirely to 
the gang but make up the smallest percentage of gang membership), conducted by 
anthropologist T.W. Ward indicated they take violations seriously, claiming, "Ifwe catch [a 
member who rats out] we'll take care of him," and proceeded to provide several examples of 
stabbings and murders. 17 
• In April 2015, a seventy-nine-year-old man was dragged out of his house and stabbed to 
death in El Salvador. 18 After killing him, MS-13 members sent a message to the community 
by hanging a piece of cardboard around the man's neck with the phrase "for snitching." 19 
• Brenda Paz was a member of MS-13 in the US who, after informing on her former boyfriend, 
also a MS-13 member, was punished according to the norm outlined by the gang. After 
entering an FBI witness protection program for providing info about a 2002 MS-13 murder 
case, Brenda's body was found, apparently stabbed and decapitated by MS-13 members. 
According to the videotaped testimony she gave to the FBI prior to her death she says, "MS 
never forgets. If you break the rules, they will hunt you down." 20 
Brenda Paz's story represents the narrative of numerous members who have violated this taboo 
and were punished accordingly. 21 According to a former prosecutor in El Salvador, gangs 
murdered at least 100 witnesses in 2010 alone, often mutilating bodies in the process. 22 This 
punishment method is impartial to location, as similar reports are found in both the US and El 
Salvador throughout the last decade, with the most recent murder of a former witness, within the 
US found in February of2018. 23 
This norm of high punishment for betrayal is deeply rooted in the independent identity of MS-13 
derived from their negative perceptual lens of El Salvador. Separated from any roots they may 
have had, MS-13 members value independence and resilience, alongside fierce loyalty to the 
gang. Gang members correlate this resilience value with toughness and violence. 24 This value 
system explains the grotesque nature of MS-13 punishment tactics for those who inform on other 
gang members. 
While the "rat out" taboo refers to initiated members, MS-13 also perceives resistance to joining 
the gang as disrespectful opposition and even betrayal, which, like the "you rat, you die" 
mentality, has resulted in a 'join or die" norm among recruitment of Salvadoran youth. Many 
Salvadoran youth have no interest in joining MS-13 and some gang members have no interest in 
continuing violent activity. 25 However, motivated by fear and seeing no way out, they are 
coerced into delinquent activity or consider fleeing to the US, where they falsely believe there 
won't be a strong MS-13 presence, to escape this punishment culture. 
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• Jorge, an eleven-year-old Salvadoran, is an example of numerous reports from youth 
regarding recruitment. 26 When Jorge declined joining MS-13 to gang members who 
infiltrated his classroom in El Salvador, they responded by holding a gun to his head and, 
pointing to a pile of his former classmates killed by MS-13, threatened Jorge that if he didn't 
join the gang, he would join the pile of corpses. Jorge complied but later fled to the US to 
escape MS-13. 27 
• In 2014, the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) interviewed a total 
of 104 randomly-selected migrant children in the US from El Salvador. According to the 
study, 66% of the children cited violence by organized armed criminal actors [gangs] as a 
primary motivator for leaving. 28 31 of the 104 children discussed past experiences of violent 
forced conscription into gang activity.29 
• Between the months of October 2013 and July 2014, United States Customs Border 
protection reported that an estimated 63,000 unaccompanied minors crossed the United 
States border, 75% of whom came from Central America, specifically Honduras, El 
Salvador, and Guatemala. 30 One minor demonstrates a common mentality found among 
Salvadoran youth, "If you don't join, the gang will shoot you ... But if you leave, no one will 
shoot you. "31 
In El Salvador general gang violence and corruption are so widespread, that leaving seems the 
safest option. The concept of the 'American Dream' is still largely believed and romanticized 
within El Salvador, making the US the ideal destination spot to create a life free from violence. 
However, after fleeing to the US, many Salvadoran immigrants land in costal cities where MS-13 
has a concentrated, if not internationally advertised, presence. With their Salvadoran descent 
creating an obvious target, immigrant youth are often met with the same unwanted gang norms 
and taboos and are likewise coerced into gang involvement within the States. 
• Juliana represents one of 8,600 immigrant youth on Long Island who fled El Salvador to 
escape MS-13, only to be persecuted by Mara Salvatrucha upon arrival in the US.32 
After only a few months in an American school, members ofMS-13 began to recruit 
Juliana and threatened her when she declined. Juliana expressed her surprise at the MS-
13 presence saying, "They [MS-13] weren't supposed to be here." 33 
• Hannah Dreier, a journalist who has spent the past year investigating MS-13 in the US 
reports, "Long Island teenagers [ many who fled El Salvador to escape gang violence] tell 
me that when they show up to school, gang members recruit them at lunch and threaten 
violence if they refuse." 34 
• A 19-year old MS-13 leader charged with six murders on Long Island told his ex-
girlfriend he was not a member when he fled El Salvador to come to the US to escape 
violence. Instead, He was recruited in the New York suburbs. 35 
Current strategy toward MS-13 often fails to recognize cultural aspects of MS-13 that imply 
many members are unwilling participants. By working with the Salvadoran government to 
provide protection and resources to youth still in El Salvador, while simultaneously seeking to 
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undermine the very culture of "you rat, you die" by working with periphery and veteran gang 
members seeking a way out of these violent norms, the US could likely decrease gang 
recruitment and violence, as well as address the influx in illegal youth immigration. 36 The US 
embassy in El Salvador could specifically oversee advertising the presence ofMS-13 within US 
borders to Salvadorans, effectively demonstrating that the US isn't a viable escape option, 
improving educational opportunities to encourage Salvadoran retention, and properly punishing 
vigilante activity to deter MS-13 recruitment in El Salvador's schools. 
US forces could further undermine recruitment by fostering a strong cultural identity amongst 
immigrant youth in the US education system. Many immigrant youths flee unaccompanied or 
live in situations where they are often alone, with family members working several jobs to keep 
them afloat. At school, they feel ostracized by language and cultural barriers that separate them 
from their peers. Often the only sense of belonging fs found in an actively recruiting gang that, 
although violent, shares a language and ethnicity that is familiar, as well undivided attention 
( evident in incessant recruiting) to youth immigrants that feel neglected. Lonely, fearing 
negative retribution if they refuse, and seeking even a rudimentary sense of community, many 
immigrant youth eventually give into the active recruiting of their MS-13 peers. 
By implementing cultural school programs in US schools that provide a safe space for 
Salvadoran immigrant youth to foster a community of their shared language, values, and beliefs, 
as well as space to improve their language and integration ability, the aforementioned MS-13 
tactic of identity estrangement and replacement will be less effective. Immigrant youth may build 
a stronger attachment to the culture that MS-13 attempts to strip, or at least they will have a safer 
place to find their community, potentially increasing resiliency to violent recruitment methods. 
MS-13 Origin Story Indicates Unchangeable Fighting Culture that Cements Gang 
Perceptions. 
MS-13 's constant warlike culture, derived directly from their origin mythology, demands an 
enemy to be fought. This culture, seen in the infamous violent nature ofMS-13 is unchangeable 
and could be a potential inhibitor of seizing the opportunity to undermine recruitment outlined 
above. 
The most prominent myth about the origin of MS-13 amongst gang members is known as the 
soccer war. The story describes a soccer match between a Mexican and Salvadoran soccer team 
in 1982 in LA. According to legend, a fight broke out, and, because the Salvadorans were 
outnumbered, they were severely beaten. The Salvadorans decided to form their own gang for 
protection and named it after the soccer team, Mara Salvatrucha. 37 This key to this story is how it 
is referred to as the original "war" rather than match or general conflict. By labeling it a war, and 
attaching it to tl1eir identity and name, MS-13 justifies fue integrated need for an enemy and the 
value of never backing down from a fight that is perceived as a war as an established MS-13 
nation. 
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Of the twelve MS-13 gang members interviewed about the origin story, none of them knew why 
the fight broke out, but all agreed that a brawl was a sufficient cause to form a gang, because 
backing down from a fight represents a major MS-13 taboo. In narrating the story, each member 
also referred the gang as a nation, demonstrating the cemented identity of MS-13 members to 
view themselves as MS-13 'citizens.' One of the 12 members interviewed expressed a 
requirement before one can enter the gang by saying, "We want to know if he's willing to fight, 
even if you're going to get your ass kicked. You can't show fear and be part of our gang," 38 
La Gloria Brincada, 39 a ceremony commonly known as a jump in, is the typical form ofMS-13 
initiation. Wannabe gang members must endure three to five MS-13 members beating them for 
the space of thirteen seconds.40 If they tap out before the thirteen seconds are up, they aren't 
allowed into the gang. 
This fighting value continues after initiation, as the gang keeps a careful tally of his fellow 
homies who have been beaten, shot, or killed. in "battles with the enemy." The tally works as a 
reputation builder (those with the most tallies gain the most respect) and also as a revenge tactic. 
If the enemy gets to a gang member, fellow gang members will seek revenge. 41 
The fact that MS-13 members refer to anyone who harms fellow members as the enemy, and any 
violent interaction as "battles" worth tallying, represent a larger warlike culture and enemy-
centric mindset, as well as further solidifies their concept of nationalism. Because this mindset is 
evident in origin mythology, in initiation ceremonies, and in MS-13 behavior, it is very unlikely 
that the US could change the fighting identity of MS-13. 
Furthermore, ifMS-13 perceives law enforcement to be abusing their role, for example, through 
unjust treatment of gang members, MS-13 may feel unnecessarily provoked and fight back, even 
if they are "going to get their ass kicked." 42 As US policy makers seek to seize opportunities to 
undermine MS-13, it is crucial to be aware of the unchanging fighting nature of gang members 
despite having no odds of success, and to avoid provoking MS-13 unnecessarily. MS-13 
members do have some respect for law enforcement, as long as member of law enforcement 
appear to be behaving justly. While officials are encouraged to remain firm towards MS-13, 
those tasked to carry out anti-gang strategy should be trained in the cultural tactics employed by 
MS-13 and properly trained in peaceful conflict-resolution, understanding that a peaceful 
resolution may not always be possible, but with the intent to contain conflicts. 
Strict Anti-Gang Policy Solidifies MS-13's Enemy-Centric View of Government, Incites 
Violence 
The 'iron-fist' anti-gang policy, which originated in the US (but isn't used in the States anymore) 
and was put into action by the Salvadoran government, strengthens MS-B's perception of the 
government as a corrupt enemy,43 consequentially increasing regional violence and illegal 
immigration to the United States.44 
The enemy-centric view held by MS-13 is perpetuated by the iron fist policy, reinstated in El 
Salvador in 2015 and supported by the US, which instructs police to use any means to 
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incarcerate and disband nascent gang cells. Since the new policy has been in place, the violent 
cycle of revenge between the Salvadoran police force and gang members has increased violence 
and corruption in El Salvador. 
• In 2013, police in El Salvador killed 39 people. In 2015, police killed 591 people, a 552-
fatality difference explained by the "iron-fist" implementation, which warned gang members 
that officers could shoot them "without any fear of suffering consequences. "45 
• In El Salvador, between 2009 and 2013, more than 500 police officers were arrested for 
corruption and involvement in criminal activities. 46 
• In 2015, at the initiation of the new policy, El Salvador became the "murder capital of the 
world" 47 by averaging almost sixteen murders a day and nearly 7,000 for the entire year. 48 
The majority of these killings are understood to be either the result of gang violence or the 
extrajudicial police killings of gang members. 49 
A study by Ignacio Cano, a Brazilian criminologist, found that 17%50 of El Salvador's fatal 
shootings in 2015 were committed by police. Furthermore, Cano defined misuse of force as 
those exceeding a 10: 1 ratio of people killed by police to police officers killed by suspects. 
According to Cano, for every one police officer killed, the police could kill ten people without 
exceeding the ethical parameters of their force. In 2016, El Salvador's figure was 59:1.51 At 
least 13 of these cases involved the prosecution of suspected gang members, despite no hard 
evidence of gang activity, followed by cover-up attempts of the Salvadoran police force. 52 
MS-13 views this iron-fist policy as a direct attack and the police force's corruption as 
justification for the gang's lawless and warlike-nature against the Salvadoran government. MS-
13, citing the grievances of an unethical government, choose instead to identify as citizens of a 
"Mara Nation," justified in abiding by the unspoken code of the gang rather than by legal 
constraints. 53 The socially constructed nation-state, MS-13, feels entitled to fight against an 
oppressive government and has responded reciprocally to the harsh government persecution. 
• In El Salvador 66 security officers were murdered in 2017 alone. 54 
• Organized attacks on police officers and their families are common 55 and fear of gang 
violence is so prevalent throughout the country that police officers wear masks to conceal 
their identities from gangs. 56 
• Christian Ambrious, a scholar at the Freie University of Berlin who is dedicated to studying 
gang violence, concludes with econometric evidence that the perceived iron-fist deportation 
policy has played an important role in spreading gang activity and increasing rampant 
violence in the El Salvador in recent years. 57 
As violence increases in the region, many flee to the US to escape, increasing illegal immigration 
rates drastically. Additionally, as gang members generalize the warlike nature of the Salvadoran 
government, they apply the same perceptual lens to all entities that compel them to abide by any 
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law other than gang code. As such, the justification for lawless behavior and a warlike-nature is 
also used by MS-13 members in the US. 
This correlation of the US seen as an enemy equal to El Salvador is strengthened by the apparent 
support for the iron-fist policy demonstrated by many policy makers within the US.58 For 
example, Attorney General Jeff Sessions has stated, "Under President Trump, the Justice 
Department has zero tolerance for gang violence." In 2017, Sessions traveled to El Salvador to 
applaud the anti-gang work of his Salvadoran counterparts, calling a recent mass raid of 
suspected gang members an "inspiration;" a raid that was conducted under the iron-fist policy. 59 
Furthermore, Rudy Guiliani, a previous New York mayor and American policy maker, helped 
legitimize the iron-fist policy when he traveled to El Salvador with his global security consulting 
firm in 2015 and spoke highly of the Salvadoran approach towards MS-13. 60 This is enemy 
perception is concrete as MS-13 views themselves as a nation with as much power and influence 
as a legitimate nation-state. 
Although direct attacks to the police force by MS-13 in the US haven't yet reached the same 
levels as their Salvadoran counterparts, mindsets towards US police officials are beginning to 
mirror mindsets toward the Salvadoran police force, as MS-13 members choose to view any 
persecution by the US government as acts of an opposing army. 
• "The war on gangs gave us exactly the opposite of what we wanted," said Michael Downing, 
an officer in L.A. referencing the zero-tolerance policies toward MS-13. "It broke down any 
trust we had with communities. We were seen as an occupying army. If you're always in the 
role of warrior, everything is a state offear." 61 
• A common MS-13 aphorism says, "Above your mother, God. But nothing above the Mara 
Nation." 62 Juan, a US gang member interviewed by dissertation student Alejandro 
Hernandez Jacky, explained this aphorism 63 and emphasized the nationality sentiments 
shared by 8 other independently interviewed members ofMS-13, within US borders. 64 
The MS-13 dichotomous view of both governments as their enemy could soften through joint 
revision of US and El Salvadoran anti-gang policies. Revisions that could most effectively 
decrease violence and illegal immigration rates include justice reforms, a legal framework for 
rehabilitating former gang members, and a shift from the current militarization against the gang. 
Specifically, if El Salvador changes their anti-gang policy so that police officers will suffer 
consequences if misuse of force is detected ( either in unwarranted arrests or violence), it is likely 
that gang-associated violence in El Salvador will eventually decrease, despite the short-term 
uptick in violence as the more radical gang members take advantage of the newly initiated 
restrictions to obtain a form of revenge. The US can aid in this transition by avoiding voicing 
public support for the current iron-fist policy in El Salvador and by seeking to properly train US 
police forces against the domestic MS-13 threat. 
Heightened Attention Feeds MS-13 Desire for Status, Increases Gang Threat 
Increased MS-13 gang references by the US in the past year satisfies the gang's need for 
attention, consequentially elevating MS-13 status and escalating gang activity, as outside gangs 
compete with the new dominant status that MS-13 holds and seeks to maintain. Just as MS-13's 
enemy-centric view of the world explains their warlike nature towards govermnent entities, MS-
13 's perception of other gangs is likewise defined by a militarized environment of competition 
and rivalry. Although all gangs value attention and are consequentially seeking to become the 
dominant status holder against their competitors, MS-13 specifically values demonic and, 
sometimes, grossly inhumane behavior to obtain this dominant status; something they believe 
differentiates MS-13 from rival gangs. 65 
• MS-13 consistently uses demonic tattoos, graffiti, and gang signs to simultaneously signal 
territory, or dominance over other gangs, and invoke attention and fear from those around 
them. 66 Of these, MS-13 differentiates themselves by being the only gang to use devil's horns 
as their primary hand signal and in their tattoos. 67 
• Informal interviews ofMS-13 members in the LA area conducted by anthropologist T.W. 
Ward indicated this need for reputation and attention with one member, Sniper, emphasized 
the unique inhumane reputation sought after by MS-13 by saying, "The other gangs knew we 
worshipped the devil. .. and that we were real crazy, crazy enough to sacrifice people. This 
gave us a good reputation." 68 
• The US Center for Immigration Studies mirrors this distinction stating, "All criminal gangs 
are a threat to public safety, but MS-13 is a unique problem because of the unusually brutal 
crimes its members have committed," with 207 MS-13 members charged for murder (out of 
506) rather than petty nuisance crimes typical of other US gangs. 69 
Harsh, dichotomous rhetoric used to reference the gang may be elevating MS-13 gang status 
over other gangs by giving them the uncontested attention they value, as well as directly 
rewarding MS-13 's violent and demonic aspirations with attention. 
• MS-13 is referenced 40 times in 22 presidential documents pulled from the year 2017. 70 
References described MS-13 as "violent," "horrible," "bloodthirsty," "disgusting," 
"savages," and "animals." None of the other 33,000 violent street gangs, motorcycle gangs, 
and prison gangs that are criminally active in the US were mentioned in any of the 22 
documents. 71 
• In 2018, the "animal" threat of MS-13 was again emphasized 72 with un-substantiated 
warnings that the Central American caravan hosts many MS-13 members, despite MS-13 
malcing up ofless than 1 % of total gang membership in the US73 and remaining significantly 
smaller in size than other less-advertised gangs such as the Crips, the Bloods, the Latin 
Kings, and Gangster Disciples in Chicago. 74 
• Twitter, a more accessible forum for gang members, further demonstrates this trend with 
presidential tweets referenced MS-13 twice in the last four months, with none of the other 
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gangs being mentioned. 75 Furthermore, MS-13 was referenced in the highly publicized 2018 
State of the Union address. 76 
This publicized attention from the Trump Administration carries more weight to MS-13 
members than other sources, because of their perception of the US. MS-13 views the US as their 
enemy, and as such, the Trump Administration's public acknowledgment ofMS-13 as a threat is 
seen as an admittance of weakness. Likewise, members ofMS-13 tend to hold the United States 
on a very high pedestal. Even though they may not like the US government, they do recognize 
the US to be the most powerful nation in the world.77 While still viewing themselves as citizens 
of the Mara Nation, rather than the US one, MS-13 members hold a grudging respect toward the 
hegemony and power of the US, and are thrilled to be considered a worthy enemy. In the minds 
ofMS-13 members, if the most powerful military player considers them a nameable threat, they 
have reached ultimate gang status and will seek to maintain this status by increasing the 
gruesome acts that are getting attention. 
If the US seeks to diversify gang references to include other violent gangs, omit the direct 
challenges to MS-13, and be more selective in descriptive rhetoric, MS-13 may be weakened and 
denied their lifeblood of attention. It is important to note that directly challenging MS-13 by 
calling them weak or inferior to other gangs will almost certainly result in a negative retaliation, 
while a passive approach to diminishing the status ofMS-13, through balanced gang coverage 
and vague descriptions, could prove most effective in weakening MS-13 reputation. Even 
casting brutality itself as weakness, though initially a compelling idea, may prove ineffective. 
MS-13 carries a deep-trenched value of fighting that has been consistent from MS-13's origin 
and members take a fierce pride in their demonic brutality. If the United States were to call out 
these brutal acts as a pitiable cry for attention, especially as they use demeaning words that 
diminish the manhood or strength ofMS-13 members such as 'small,' 'afraid,' or 'children,' 
MS-13 members would interpret it as an attack on their values and may want to fight back. By 
not engaging in MS-13's need for attention, instead spealdng of the gang threat in measured and 
balanced terms, the US can snuff out the fire that feeds MS-13's reputation, rather than fuel it. 
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OUTLOOK 
In order to decrease gang activity, violence, and recruitment, as well as deter illegal immigration 
to the US from El Salvador, the United States can seek to change cnrrent conversation regarding 
MS-13, work with El Salvador to reform anti-gang policies, encourage deportee retention in El 
Salvador, and take preventative measures against gang recruitment. 
Changing the conversation regarding gangs can be the most advantageous strategy to weaken 
MS-13 reputation and influence within the United States. Diversifying gang references to 
include other violent gangs, omitting the direct challenges to MS-13, and being more selective in 
descriptive rhetoric could be an effective combatant against MS-13's need for attention. It is 
important to note that directly challenging MS-13 by calling them weak or inferior to other gangs 
could result in a negative retaliation, while a passive approach to diminishing the status ofMS-
13, through balanced gang coverage and vague descriptions, could prove most effective in 
weakening MS-13 reputation. As US leaders make this shift, news media will follow suit, as 
most news stories covering MS-13 stem from public comments made by US officials. Likewise, 
avoiding voicing current support of Salvadoran anti-gang policies could likely soften MS-13 's 
warlike perception of the US and be an ideal starting point for joint El Salvador-US revisions of 
anti-gang policies aimed to decrease violence in El Salvador and illegal immigration to the US. 
Immigration rates could further decrease as the US works with El Salvador to reform these 
policies through justice reforms, a legal framework for rehabilitating former gang members, and 
a shift from the cnrrent militarization against the gang. Specifically, the US could encourage El 
Salvador to changes their anti-gang policy so that police officers will suffer consequences if 
misuse of force is detected while simultaneously seeking to properly train US police forces 
against the domestic MS-13 threat. Current US anti-gang policy of deporting convicted 
members could be further improved if a reentry adjustment component for deportees is applied. 
This reentry component could focus on providing deportees with the practical and cultural tools, 
such as job placement, nationalism development, and citizenship awareness, necessary to 
reintegrate effectively back into El Salvador. Community development programs on the 
Salvadoran side could further increase Salvadoran retention rates. As deportees begin to form 
cultural, value-driven connections with El Salvador, they will be more likely to smoothly 
reintegrate into society and less likely to return to the US illegally. 
These combined polices will be integral to addressing the current MS-13 threat. Preventative 
strategy can also be implemented by combating MS-13 recruitment. The US could work with 
the Salvadoran government to provide resources to youth still in El Salvador, advertise the 
presence ofMS-13 within US borders to Salvadorans, effectively demonstrating that the US isn't 
a viable escape option, and properly punish vigilante activity to deter MS-13 recruitment in El 
Salvador's schools. US forces could further undermine recruitment by fostering a strong cultural 
identity amongst immigrant youth in the US education system through extracurricular programs. 
These programs could give youth a place to feel included and likely help youth to form a 
stronger identity attempts to strip, potentially increasing resiliency to violent recruitment 
methods. 
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Reflective Writing 
When choosing the subject-matter for my capstone project, I wanted to encompass key 
elements of my undergraduate experience while spring-boarding into the next step in my 
academic and professional career. I settled in on using the Cultural Topography method to 
explore an issue relevant both to US and Salvadoran security to pay homage to my focus area of 
my undergraduate degree, deepen my critical thinking and writing ability within this focus area, 
allow a cross disciplinal approach to a research project, further develop meaningful mentor 
relationships, and engage with my national community on a subject of critical global relevance. 
An immense amount of work went into producing this final capstone project and I am grateful 
that I have a product that reflects the depth and variety of skills I have gained while obtaining my 
BA in International Studies from Utah State University. 
After a semester of exploring within International Studies, I chose my area of focus to be 
Peace and Security. Throughout my undergraduate experience I have been dedicated to taking 
classes that have informed on the history of, and methods used by, the intelligence community in 
the US national security discipline. My favorite and most challenging classes have all fallen into 
this area of focus and, as such, I was determined to incorporate this integral aspect of my 
academic career into my capstone. It was difficult to decide on the exact subject matter I wanted 
to explore, as the discipline is vast, and I have a variety of interests. I proposed several different 
capstone ideas before settling in on the piece that has been covered by my current capstone. 
Although my original ideas were interesting, they didn't quite capture policy relevance to 
national security nor had the added focus on Latin America, a sub-focus area that has become 
quite present in both my academic and professional pursuits. In overcoming the challenge of 
deciding on a topic that was narrow enough to become an expert on, with a concrete tie to policy 
relevance, and involving Latin America, I turned to my mentor Jeannie Johnson who was 
invaluable in helping me narrow down my scope. Over the course of exploring this capstone, I 
was able to add a depth to my undergraduate focus area of Peace and Security by exploring 
strategy techniques employed by specific national security institutions when confronting a very 
real and very narrow security threat. I was also able to employ Cultural Topography, a writing 
and research technique, that is used by the intelligence community I may work for someday. 
This gave me a concrete skill that added to the more academic foundation I had already gained 
throughout my undergraduate degree. 
In using Cultural Topography, and in using a threat with Latin America ties, I was able to 
move past my typical academic discipline oflnternational Studies and use a more practical 
application of the intelligence community. It was difficult to move out of the comfort zone of 
academic writing and tackle a new writing style, but it was so worth it. I would encourage 
future students to be willing to tal,e risks in completing their capstone, it proved essential in 
developing a new writing skill while completing my capstone. I also used some nominal Spanish 
language skills to do research about ties to El Salvador in their native language. This allowed me 
to gain depth in a discipline, Spanish, that I didn't have time dedicated to in my academic 
coursework. The joy I found in researching in Spanish led me to pursue intern and volunteer 
opportunities in both Guatemala and Peru which shaped my undergraduate experience. The 
confidence in my language abilities evolved as I worked on my capstone and led me to apply to 
research and scholarship positions that necessitate mastery of the Spanish language. In the 
lV 
process of researching El Salvador, I became acquainted with refugee patterns that also shaped 
my international experiences and that I am currently seeking to expand on as I seek out future 
career opportunities. Overall, my capstone experience was integral in shaping key experiences 
while in my undergraduate degree and in providing me the skills necessary to earn the internship 
position that acts as the next step in my professional career. 
Another key component of my capstone that proved integral in shaping my undergraduate 
experience and improving the prospects of professional opportunities was my ability to develop 
relationships with key mentors. My honors capstone mentor, Dr. Jeannie Johnson, has given me 
a very clear understanding of what life working in the intelligence community would entail, as 
well as helped me get the writing and research skills necessary in order to compete in this field. 
Because of my initial relationship I formed in completing this capstone, I was invited to attend 
her upper-division courses that led to a key networking trip to Washington DC and invaluable 
writing and research experience. She has graciously provided glowing letters of 
recommendations that have created success in current pursuits, and I expect in pursuits to come. 
Overall, she is a ready contact as I continue in my academic pursuits and consider joining a 
career in the intelligence community. Dr. Johnson also introduced me to mentors Matt Berrett 
and Briana Bowen who have been integral in completing this capstone and in considering 
different options for my future pursuits. These two individuals made my undergraduate 
experience far more stimulating, have given much-needed and appreciated advice, and have 
pledged their support as I tackle the job force. The biggest piece of advice I could give to future 
students is to choose a mentor who is dedicated to your success. Completing my capstone in a 
timely and effective manner would not have been possible without the help of my mentors. 
Finally, my capstone allowed me to engage with my global community. By choosing a 
global issue with security relevance, I was able to relate to people both in the US and abroad. I 
am excited to present my findings at the research event at Capitol Hill in March, where I will be 
able to discuss this important issue with key legislators and further engage with my community. 
My biggest capstone triumph will to be able to talk about what I have dedicated my time to on a 
larger stage. This capstone was a very long process, but it didn't seem as challenging or tedious 
because I was passionate about what I was learning and the conclusions I could convey. In fact, 
I feel like I could do a lot more on this capstone, if not for the time constraint and other research 
interests. 
For students that are beginning their capstone, in addition to choosing key mentors, talrn 
the time to determine what you are passionate about exploring in your capstone. Doing so will 
allow each completed concept a triumph, make severe challenges easier to tackle, and ultimately 
makes the amount of work seem feasible. I genuinely enjoyed my Honors Capstone and am 
grateful for a meaningful product that accurately represents the triumph of my undergraduate 
expenence. 
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Professional Autobiography 
Hannah Penner will obtain her BA in International Studies with a minor in German and an 
emphasis in Peace and Security in May 2019. She loves understanding different languages and 
cultures and wants to apply this to a future career either in professional writing or as an analyst. 
Hannah has been working as a research assistant throughout her entire undergraduate career and 
has successfully revised a geopolitics textbook, created an annotated timeline of 
Chinese/Myanmar relations, and completed a comprehensive list of all literature published on the 
One Belt One Road economic initiative. Hannah is currently the head writer and manager of a 
geopolitical news-based website through the CHaSS department and presented this project at the 
Utah Conference of Undergraduate Research. Hannah is further involved at Utah State 
University acting as a member of Sigma Iota Rho, a teacher's assistant for the political science 
department, and as a writing tutor. In addition to her tutoring responsibilities for the writing 
center, Hannah has also created an extensive curriculum for the center's Teaching English 
Afternoon (TEA) Time program. She leads these weekly meetings that provide a setting for 
international students to improve their English-speaking skills. Last summer, Hannah interned in 
Peru as a business consultant for local entrepreneurs through the SEED program of the 
Huntsman School of Business, thus earning the global scholarship designation. Hannah has 
accepted a position as a global acquisition paid intern for the Church of Jesus Christ ofLatter-
Day Saint's history department on their Latin America desk. She is excited to drown in Spanish 
research for a year before beginning her graduate degree in 2020. 
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